There is a real distinction between what does not exist and what does exist. But a nonexistent essence that is an object of knowledge is not really distinct from the essence that will exist when it is more than an object of knowledge. Therefore there must be a real distinction between the existence by which in essence is more than an object of knowledge and the same essence that can be an object of knowledge even when it is not more than an object of knowledge.

June 16, 2005

Every object, every quod, is more than what-is-objectified-in-this-particular-way at least conceptually. Can every object be only conceptually distinct from the existence that makes it more than an object really, not just conceptually? If so, then existence can be only conceptually distinct from what can be only conceptually distinct from being an object. So existence can be only conceptually distinct from, being an object, being known.

June 15, 2005

The object of any kind of knowledge is always more than just what is objectified in this way in at least a conceptual sense. The word function of "exists" expresses the state of being more than an object really not just conceptually. Can existence be that which distinguishes the thing from from being merely conceptually distinct from being an object if existence is distinct from what the object is only conceptually? (This looks like a good argument for the real distinction between essence an existence.)

What something is is conceptually other than being an object of knowledge and conceptually other than its real existence, conceptually other than the existence by which ii
is really, not just conceptually, other than being an object. If what something is is merely conceptually distinct from the existence that is supposed to make it more then conceptually distinct from its being an object of knowledge, can what an object of knowledge is be really identical with something that is more than conceptually distinct from being an object of knowledge?

What something is is conceptually distinct from being an object of knowledge. If what something is is also only conceptually distinct from its existence, can its existence make it more than conceptually distinct from being an object of knowledge?

Can what something is be really more than just an object of knowledge if its real existence is identical with the what

If being an existing thing is only conceptually distinct from being an object, being an existing thing

If being an existing thing is only conceptually distinct from being what this thing is or what that thing is,

June 15, 84

If essence and existence are not distinct, for a tree the distinction between being-an-object and being-an-existing-thing would amount to the distinction between being-and-object and being-a-tree. But being a tree is already conceptually distinct from being an object; if being a tree is only conceptually distinct from being a real existent, how does being a real existent constitute the tree's being a more than conceptually distinct from being an object?
An essence can be a mere term of a knowledge relation, and being the term of a knowledge relation is really distinct from existing. If essence were identical with existence, either essence could not be the mere term of a knowledge relation or being the term of a knowledge relation would not be really distinct from existing.

Existence does not just make something more than conceptually distinct from being an object; it makes it independent of being an object, causally independent of being an object. Only if it is causally distinct from being an object can existence have causal priority over being an object. Existence is not only the real otherness from being an object; it is the real independence from being an object.

February 2, 79
Existence is an essence's ability to be a cause of knowledge in the order of exercise. If existence is only conceptually distinct from essence, why isn't the essence of an object a cause of knowledge in the order of exercise in every case of knowledge?

March 28, 82
Perhaps "existence" cannot objectify the state in which things are in causal priority over their being known unless existence is something really distinct from that which exists. That which exists, that which an object of cognition is, always has causal priority over the cognition in the order of specification. Even a Gold Mountain is cause of our acts of imagining a Gold Mountain in the order of specification.

But our awareness of all these causes of awareness in the order of specification ultimately derive from sensory awareness in which the existence of the object is a cause of awareness in the order of exercise. Now if what exists is identical with its existence, and its existence makes it the cause of one kind of cognition in the order of exercise, how can the
identical existence not be the cause of other modes of awareness, like imagining and conceiving, in the order of exercise? How can that which as causal priority in the order of exercise in one case not have causal priority in the others?

There is a real distinction between existing and being an object of knowledge. And there is a real distinction between what does not exist (but which may be an object of knowledge) and what does exist. The logical relation of possibility attaches to something in so far as it is an object of knowledge; possibility of attaches to something as term of a relation which is really distinct from real, extra objective existence. And that which the relation of possibility of attaches to may not exist and, hence, may be really distinct from that which exists, that which is fully extra objective.

By means of the logical relation of possibility we accomplish the diverse objectification of existence as mentioned from existence as asserted. But it does not follow that the difference between these objects consist only of a logical relation. If it did consist only of a logical relation, everything whose existence can be mentioned would really exist.

Existence is precisely the difference between and essence's being a mere term of a knowledge relation and its being more than a term of a knowledge relation, a difference that is not reducible to the mere absence of a logical relation or knowledge relation, because existence is more than logically distinct from being the term of a knowledge relation.

February 12, 79

Whatever differentiates a mere term of a knowledge relation from what is more than such a term is causally prior to the knowledge relation.
March 12, 91

Maybe we can get to the essence/existence distinction this way: the difference between a merely imagined or conceived object and a sensed object is a state of act, an actualization. Objects of imagination and conception are potential with regard to that state of act. If this relation of being potential to existence were only logical, would to exist amount to to be perceived, to be known?

June 13, 2005

What is objectified by "existence" is that which is most actual, that which is not an ontological capacity relative to anything else. (So the existence of a substance is other than a substance, since a substance is a capacity for accidents.)

Maybe approach it this way: what is that which is most actual? Or, is there a form of act which is most actual, which is not a potency for anything else?

Being does not abstract from man even though existence may be really distinct from man. For the word function of "man" includes a reference to what may be really distinct from it, includes a logical relation to possible existence. But the fact that the relation is logical can make it appear that existence has only a logical function relative to the word functions of predicates. But the term of this logical relation, existence, is not itself a logical relation on pain of to exist amounting to being known.

Existence is truthfully attributed to something red, and is so attributed because the word function of "something red" actually exists, is identical with something that actually exists. But the word function of "exists" is not a relative to the fact that something red is objectified but to the thing that is objectified by the word function of "something red," not relative to the "concept" of something red but to the thing which is objectified. Or it is
relative to the word function of "something red" insofar as that word function is at least potentially more-than-and-object. If something red exists, that potentiality is fulfilled relative to the word function of "something red" precisely in so far as that word function is eligible to be not just an object but more than an object.

By means of the logical relation of possibility we accomplish the diverse objectification of existence as mentioned from existence as asserted. But it does not follow that the difference between these objects consist only of a logical relation. If it did consist only of a logical relation, everything whose existence can be mentioned would really exist. So in general, when diverse objectification is accomplished by logical relations the difference between what is objectified need not consist only of logical relations. (Does this formulation contradict the formulation of the deduction of logical necessity in chapter four? Check this formulation against the negation section in chapter four.)

xxx the word function of "exists," August 21, 87

The word function of "existence" is that which terminates the causal relation by which public objects have causal priority over their objectification in language, and objects of sensation have causal priority over their being sensed, their objectification in sensation, and terminates the causal relations by which states of affairs cause sentences to be true.

Words are used for something other than themselves, and "exists" names that something other, whatever else it may be, that is causally prior to words. So without that which "exists" happens to name, there would be no language. It is entirely contingent that "exists" has this use or that this use has come into language at all. But given that contingent fact, we cannot avoid its consequences, that is, that what "exists" happens the be used for is logically included in other word functions because it is causally prior to language.
The concept of existence is logically prior to the concept of cause, still we can explain what it means to exist by using the concept of cause. To exist is to be in the state having ultimate causal priority over being the term of a knowledge relation, being an object. That which exists is that which has causal priority over knowledge. "It exists" means it is the term of the causal relation between knowledge and its causes ("causal relation" is not redundant here since there may be other kinds of relations between knowledge and its causes). To describe something as existing is to describe it as having causal priority, as eligible to be the cause.

This is not make the concept of cause prior to that of existence. All concepts are subsequent to existence. Cause is that particular subsequent concept that articulates why existence enters the language, that is, the function that "exists" has when it enters the language, namely, being the term of this particular causal relation. First we have the concept of existence. Then we use existence to form of causal concepts. Then we use causal concepts to recognize that when existence first entered language it entered as the term of what we can now know to be a particular causal relation. (Not that "exists" means "having causal priority." It means much more than that. But "Having causal priority over being an object of knowledge" expresses the way it enters language and the reason it enters language.

Whatever differentiates a mere term of a knowledge relation from what is more than such a term is causally prior to the knowledge relation. To keep asking "but what *is* existence" implies that there could be something more ultimate in terms of which to understand existence. But existence is ultimate both as the effect of a cause and as that which enables a cause to be a cause; existence is the ultimate term of causal connections at
both ends of the connection. (To be a cause an essence must really exist as opposed to just being an object of knowledge that exhibits certain causal dispositions.)

To describe it as being more than the term of a knowledge relation is not to make it a relative to knowledge, as if object descriptions come first. Existence is more than the term of a knowledge relation as causally prior to knowledge relations both in reality and in the genesis of our concepts.

Existence cannot be explained by reducing it to something else, even though we constantly try to. Existence is that by reference to which everything else is to be explained, including the word function of "that which exists" or any particular word function for that which exists, for example, "man", "dog", etc. Explanations are causal, and causal concepts are functions of existence.

September 12, 85

"Exists" objectifies the table as "square" or "made of wood" or "four-legged" do, that is, without relating tables to knowledge; it does not objectify the table as an object. And "exists" is other than being the term of a knowledge relation where "other" means more than as an object, not just as an object, not just as a term of a knowledge relation.

What does "exist" say about table? It attributes to the table that without which there would be nothing more to say, that which is ultimate both in knowledge and in that which is more than the term of a knowledge relation about the table. That beyond which there is nothing and without which there is nothing.

June 15, 2005

The question is given that what exists can be objectified without existence, without
objectifying its actual existence, how could it be identical with its existence, the existence it is objectified as having in sensation and is the reference point of all explanation? What could account for the diversity in objectification between and essence and its existence if they were not really distinct?

We cannot say that we logically distinguish that which exists from existence by abstracting from existence. Abstraction leaves aside the effects of potency; existence is the act to which all potencies are relative.

June 13, 2005

Logical relations are not that which we know about something when it is first known; logical relations are properties attaching to something other than logical relations as a result of the fact that this something-other-than-logical-relations is known. Existence is one such something-other-than-logical-relations to which logical relations attach when something other than logical relation becomes that which is known. Possibility is such a logical relation attaching to that which is first known but not entering into it.

May 23, 83

Philosophical truths express conditions for the possibility of existence, the possibility of *actual* existence; for that is what possibility is the possibility of, that is, actual existence. So the opposite of a necessary truth is impossible because the opposite denies (excludes, removes) some condition for the possibility of existence.

June 13, 2005

Are possible existents cognition-constituted objects? Are non-existents? No, dinosaurs are not cognition-constituted objects.
"A tiger is tame" is equivalent to "a tiger exists and is tame." 
"Some tigers are tame" is not equivalent to "some tigers exist and are tame." It is equivalent to "some existing Tigers exist and are tame."

The difference between "tame tigers do not exist" and "some tame tigers do not exist" is that "some tame tigers" already objectifies the tame tigers as existing. "Some" objectifies them as existing because existence enters objectification otherwise than other predicates to, otherwise than the predicates of which existence is asserted do.

June 15, 2005

"There is something that is an F." is their redundancy between "there is" and "something"? No. By means of "something" being is taken with the logical relation of possibility; "something" mentions existence. That is, it logically includes existence as mentioned, not as asserted. There is no redundancy since existence as asserted, which is what "there is" does, is not logically included in "something."